Endosulfan is a highly toxic pesticide that accumulates in the food chain and in humans, travels long distances, and breaks down very slowly in the environment. Recently, an expert committee of the Stockholm Convention1 concluded that endosulfan requires global action to prevent further harms to human health and the environment2, and recommended listing it under Annex A of the Convention for global elimination3. In 2009, the Convention Expert Committee noted that more than 60 countries had banned endosulfan4. The number now stands at more than 70. The Indian chemical industry is the world's largest producer of endosulfan. As scientific evidence mounts of their product's toxic impacts, the Indian industry has realized that endosulfan cannot be defended on scientific grounds. Instead the industry has resorted to a variety of tactics to prevent global action needed to protect humans and the environment. These actions include:
Denying the toxicity of endosulfan
After a one-year review of the scientific literature, the Stockholm Convention POPs Review Committee determined in 2009 that "The toxicity and ecotoxicity of endosulfan is well documented. Endosulfan is highly toxic for humans and for most animal taxa, showing both acute and chronic effects at relatively low exposure levels."5 The Indian chemical industry denies this evidence even when confronted by the real human tragedy of documented harm from endosulfan spraying in the Indian States of Kerala and Karnataka. 
In both the Stockholm Convention and Rotterdam Convention processes in 2009 - 2010, the Indian members of the committees and the Indian pesticide industry continued to deny that endosulfan caused any harm at all to humans, and expressed outraged denial of the documented evidence that endosulfan had caused serious endocrine, neurological, reproductive and organ damage, including birth defects, congenital neurological conditions, cancers and deaths in their own country - in the Kasargod district of the southern Indian state of Kerala. In contrast, the Kerala State government recognizing the health effects banned endosulfan and is paying compensation to many of the victims. At one meeting the Indian member and industry supporters tried even to deny the ban had taken place. Recently, the neighbouring state of Karnataka has also banned endosulfan. In what appears to be a gradual acceptance by the government of India that endosulfan has indeed caused the above effects, the Minister of Agriculture recently said in the Lok Sabha (Parliament) that the problem lay with the aerial spraying of endosulfan, and that it should not have been aerial sprayed. Yet denials by the Indian pesticide industry continue, even to the extent of blaming the observed effects of endosulfan in Kasargod on "inherited genetic disorders"6.
Insisting that there are no feasible alternatives to endosulfan
The Indian chemical industry forcefully denies the existence of non-chemical alternatives to endosulfan for cotton and other crops. Ironically, Excel Crop Care is both a large Indian endosulfan manufacturer and the owner of Agrocel, a marketer of organic cotton, profitably cultivated without endosulfan.
At the Stockholm Convention expert committee (POPRC) meeting in 2009, the Indian committee member and the Indian chemical industry repeatedly tried to deny that organic farming is an existing cost-effective and viable alternative to endosulfan (and other pesticide) use in India, despite being presented with factual information that India is a highly successful producer of organic cotton...something they should realize from their corporate partner which they happen to own.7 The Indian government/industry personnel further attempted to delete all mention of such alternatives from the Risk Management Evaluation of endosulfan. In subsequent media statements the Indian pesticide industry has attempted to fuel scaremongering by suggesting that banning endosulfan would lead to higher food prices in India.8 This is contradicted by an economic analysis from the World Bank. A recent World Bank report that examined non-pesticide management of crops in the Indian State of Andra Pradesh. The results showed increases in yields of some crops and maintenance of yields in others with an overall increase in income for farmers in the state of who adopted non-pesticide management of their crops.9
Accusing the European Union of a conspiracy plot to ban endosulfan
The Indian industry accuses the European Union of trying to compete with Indian companies by shifting the world from a cheap pesticide like endosulfan to its own "patented alternatives". The problem? There simply are no patented alternatives the EU is proposing. Let's repeat: The EU has no proposals for a patented pesticide product to replace endosulfan. The conspiracy sounds exciting but there is nothing to back it up. Since there is no conspiracy, the Indian industry went on the attack.
The Endosulfan Manufacturers and Formulators Welfare Association (EMFWAI) invented a front group call "Conventions Watch Desk" which attacked the EU's proposal to list endosulfan in the Stockholm Convention, saying it is an effort to eliminate the use of a low-priced pesticide beneficial to India. Subsequently, various Indian pesticide industry groups, such as the Pesticides Manufacturers and Formulators Association of India, have repeatedly made media statements that EU is trying to get a global ban on endosulfan so that it can replace endosulfan use with its own more highly priced newer insecticides.10
A few facts are in order:
1) The Stockholm Convention Committee which recommended the global elimination of endosulfan is not just composed of EU countries. In addition to India, the Committee contains Members from Argentina, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Canada, Chad, China, Chile, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Czech Republic, Egypt, Finland, France, Ghana, Honduras, Japan, Jordan, Korea, Mauritius, New Zealand, Nigeria, Portugal, Switzerland, Syria, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Ukraine, and Zambia. Let's call this what it is: A group of experts from all UN regions that recommended that global elimination of endosulfan.
2) The industry blames the EU, but more than 40 developing countries and countries with economies in transition have either banned endosulfan or are in the process of prohibiting it. This includes countries dependent on agricultural products such as cotton and coffee. The industry does not talk about the "Sahelian conspiracy" despite the fact that all nine West African countries banned the substance even though cotton is an important economic crop.
Inflated usage figures
The Indian chemical industry has tried to make an economic case that endosulfan is simply "too big to ban". The numbers tell a different story.
In another bid to halt the tide of public opinion in India against endosulfan, the Indian pesticide industry's media campaign has made grossly exaggerated claims about the worth of endosulfan on the world market. They have repeatedly stated that endosulfan is the third largest selling insecticide in the world. However when it came to a court hearing, over the ban in Karnataka, they deflated their claims somewhat, stating that endosulfan is "among the top five generic, off-patent agricultural insecticides in the world"11.
Even this correction is hard to swallow given that the total world production of endosulfan was estimated by the Stockholm Convention expert committee (POPRC)12 to be 18,000-20,000 metric tonnes, and the US EPA estimates total global usage of insecticides in 2007 to have been 405,000 metric tonnes13. That makes annual endosulfan consumption only about 5% of total global insecticide use.
Based on the annual production figure of 18-20,000 tonnes and India's share of this as 10,000 tonnes, The Stockholm Convention expert committee (POPRC) estimated that a global ban on endosulfan would cost all manufacturers US $122-125 million, with India's share of that being US $62 million. India aggressively claimed, without providing evidence that its endosulfan industry is worth US$100 million. This was accepted and is reflected in the Committee's final Risk Management Evaluation.
When the industry realized that an even bigger number would be better for campaign purposes, they made subsequent claims that elevated the worth of the industry to US $ 1 billion14, with PMFAI (Pesticides Manufacturers and Formulators' Association of India) saying that India makes 900,000 tonnes of endosulfan annually, and controls 80% of the world market.15
The real numbers? Try 5% of the world market and 10,000 tonnes.
Dismissing concerns over harm to bees
The Indian industry describes endosulfan as "safe to pollinators!" However, product labels tell a different story.
Recognising that endosulfan is toxic to honeybees, a number of regulators took steps to reduce the damage. For example, Canada mandated that labels of endosulfan products sold in that country bear the statement:
"TOXIC to bees exposed to direct treatment, drift, or residues on flowering crops or weeds. DO NOT apply this product to flowering crops or weeds if bees are visiting the treatment area. Minimize spray drift to reduce harmful effects on bees in habitats close to the application site."16
The US state of Washington has required that "Pollinator Protection Statements" appear on the labels of certain endosulfan products, limiting their use in such a way as to protect bees. For example, the state requires that products sold for use on alfalfa bear the statement:
"This product is highly toxic to bees exposed to direct treatment or residues on blooming crops or broadleaf weeds. Do not apply the 1.33 quarts per acre (1 lb ai/A) rate of this product to blooming seed alfalfa: apply at that rate as a pre-bloom or post-bloom spray only. Application of the 1.33 pints per acre (0.5 lb ai/A) rate of this product to blooming seed alfalfa must be timed to coincide with periods of minimum bee activity, between late evening and midnight."17
All Makhteshim Agan endosulfan products sold in the US bear the following statement on their label: "This pesticide is toxic to bees exposed to direct application. Applications should be timed to coincide with periods of minimum bee activity, usually between late evening and early morning."18
These label statements are given real meaning by the outcome of a case-study of the socio-economic impacts of endosulfan use on honey production in Kasargod. It revealed that there was a substantial drop in honey production during the period of endosulfan aerial spraying, and then following the ban it has increased marginally.19 Thirty-one beekeepers and 14 members of the Koranga community that gather wild honey from the forest were interviewed. The pre-aerial spraying annual production of 12,015kg of managed honey fell to 68.5 kg during the spraying years in the 1980s and has since risen to 133kg. The collection of wild honey from the forest dropped from 3,375 kg annual pre-spraying to 938kg during the spraying years.
Endosulfan, as a broad-spectrum insecticide is toxic to bees and a wide-range of beneficial insects. The acute honeybee oral LD50 is 2 ug/bee, and the acute contact LD50 is 0.82 to 4.5 ug/bee.20 Sublethal effects of endosulfan on bees include reduced olfactory learning.21
Preventing countries from receiving information about endosulfan imports
The Rotterdam Convention gives governments control over their own borders by requiring consent for the import of substances on its list. The Indian chemical industry has worked aggressively to deny governments the right to refuse an import of endosulfan.
In 2009, the Indian chemical Industry aggressively worked with the Indian government delegation at the Fourth Conference of the Parties (COP) to the Rotterdam Convention22 to block addition of endosulfan to the treaty, despite the fact that it met all Convention requirements and was recommended for listing by the treaty's expert committee. Addition to the Rotterdam Convention would not ban the substance, but require participating exporting countries to ensure that participating importing countries give their consent to the proposed import before exports take place. Blocking the listing of endosulfan under the Rotterdam Convention means that Indian chemical companies can continue to export endosulfan to countries whose governments may not want it imported, including potentially to countries that have already banned it. By blocking the listing of a substance that meets all the Convention's criteria, India has placed the entire treaty in jeopardy of becoming irrelevant.
The Indian Chemical Council (ICC) representatives and Indian government nominees to the Chemical Review Committee (CRC) of the Rotterdam Convention tried many tactics to prevent the CRC from recommending for the second time that endosulfan be considered by the PIC COP for listing, this time at its Fifth meeting in Geneva in June 2011. In 2009 and 2010 the CRC considered notifications of final regulatory action from the nine West African countries that jointly regulate their pesticides under the Sahelian Pesticides Committee23, and from New Zealand. In discussing the West African nominations the Indian Chemical Council and Indian delegate raised a number of spurious objections, including:
- The nomination is invalid because of legal technicalities.
- Africans should wear protective clothing - it's not the chemical's fault they get poisoned.
- India did not agree that there is comparable susceptibility of people in USA and Australia with people in Africa - Africans might be more robust and less susceptible to effects of endosulfan.
- They claim that there have been no health or environmental problems with endosulfan in India.
- India questioned the objectivity of other country delegates, and accused the committee of a cover-up.
In the end India forced the West African nominations to be held over from CRC 2009 to CRC 2010 where they then forced a vote to be taken; and they forced the New Zealand nomination to be held over from 2010 to 2011. India also refused to accept the legal definition of misuse of a pesticide provided by the UNEP legal Services, as had been requested by the Fourth Conference of the Parties. This was in relation to Thailand's notification of severe restriction on endosulfan that had been accepted by the CRC and recommended to the Fourth PIC COP.
Through these objections and actions India, working closely with its chemical industry representative, attempted to derail the whole treaty process simply to preserve the profitable manufacture of endosulfan in their country, with no regard for the health of their own people, or the health and environmental contamination their continued manufacture, export and use causes in other countries. Even worse, they have effectively intruded on the right of countries to control their own borders from unwanted imports.
Blocking consensus that endosulfan is a persistent organic pollutant (POP)
The Indian government adopted the chemical industry position at the Stockholm Convention POPs Review Committee (POPRC) and refused to agree to consensus decisions by the 31-Member Committee…for three years in a row.
India blocked consensus and forced a vote to be taken by the Committee in 2008, 2009 and 2010. In 2009, India was the only country (out of 31) to vote against the proposal to proceed with the evaluation. Despite India's efforts, the Stockholm Convention expert committee (POPRC) concluded that endosulfan warrants global action.24 In 2010 India refused to even take part in the decision making process, again forcing the POPRC to vote to recommend to the Conference of the Parties that endosulfan be listed under Annex A for global elimination.
As with the Rotterdam Convention expert committee process, the Indian delegates and pesticide industry representatives consistently tried to derail the process by raising legal challenges, and refusing to accept the validity of scientific modelling of risk. The objections were political, not scientific, despite the scientific nature of both committees.
Participating in decision-making despite clear conflicts of interest
The Government of India owns Hindustan Insecticides Limited25, which manufactures technical grade endosulfan, and therefore has a vested financial interest in preventing its listing in the Stockholm Convention. This did not stop India from fully participating in decision-making, despite the clear conflict of interest.
Due to this conflict of interest, IPEN and PAN believe that India should participate in the discussions concerning endosulfan but recuse itself during the decision-making phases of both Conventions. Before the 5th and 6th POPRC meetings in October 2009 and October 2010 delegates met in closed-door sessions to declare their conflicts of interest. Apparently India did not declare a conflict of interest because they participated fully in the decision-making regarding endosulfan despite being a producer of the substance under discussion. As a result, one country with a vested financial interest has severely threatened the integrity of two United Nations Conventions.
Attacking civil society representatives that report on the harms of endosulfan
When all else fails, the Indian chemical industry attacks the messenger. The industry has used all possible tactics for silencing the voices of civil society groups, scientists and institutions that have raised concerns about the harm of endosulfan. These include threatening letters, legal notices, defamation lawsuits, organizing protests, and vicious personal attacks.
In 2003, the Pesticide Association of India (now Crop Care Federation of India) sent legal notices to authors of a fact-finding report titled Killing Fields of Warangal, which documented the circumstances leading to the deaths of farm workers in Warangal district of Andhra Pradesh. Based on the post mortem reports, interviews of doctors at the local government hospital and family members of the deceased, the fact-finding team indicated that the deaths may have resulted from acute poisoning that occurred while the workers were spraying pesticides. The report was published in 2000 and caught the attention of the media, government, judiciary and UN bodies in 2002, prompting the pesticide industry to send a legal notice to the authors threatening legal action and claiming damages up to Rs 10 crores ($2.2 million USD). In 2005, the industry changed tactics and filed a criminal defamation suit against the authors, which later led to the issuance of non-bailable arrest warrants for the authors. At great personal risk and expenses, the authors defended their report and finally in 2010 the Supreme Court of India quashed the defamation suit.
Umendra Dutt, a farmer activist from Punjab has received innumerable letters, legal notices, including a defamation suit for Rs 5 crores ($ 1.1 million USD) filed in 2006 against him by one of the biggest pesticide manufacturing companies in India, United Phosphorus Limited (UPL). In May 2006, when Dutt was organising a seminar on health hazards of pesticides in Chandigarh (capital of Punjab), the pesticide industry tried every possible means to stop him, including sending letters to the speakers with veiled threats of possible legal action if they dared to participate in the seminar. The letters were sent through Mumbai based NGO-Centre for Environment and Agrochemicals (CENTEGRO), an organisation fronting the pesticide industry.
The industry did not stop at Dutt. It also filed a case against Bennett and Coleman, the publisher of one the largest circulating English newspapers, The Times of India, for publishing a quote by Dutt in one its dailies, Mumbai Mirror.
In 2003, Dr Y S Mohana Kumar of Padre village in Kasaragod district of Kerala, infamous for its endosulfan disaster, received a legal notice from the pesticide industry threatening him with massive financial damages. His crime was working tirelessly with sick and dying villagers whose bodies, water, soil and environment had been poisoned by twenty years of aerial spraying of endosulfan over state-owned cashew plantations in the area. Mohana Kumar carefully documented the evidence of health damages and wrote about it in the local medical journal.
Since 2001, when Centre for Science and Environment (CSE) first published its scientific findings of the presence of endosulfan in human and environmental samples in Kasargaod, CSE and its Director-General, Sunita Narain, have been the target of vicious industry slander. They have been bombarded with letters, legal notices and threats by the industry, some of it being very personal and abusive in nature. In April 2008, the industry NGO CENTEGRO hired a PR agency to picket outside CSE's office and Narain's home in New Delhi, with placards discrediting CSE's study and attacking Narain personally. Rajju Shroff, head of UPL drew a lewd caricature of Narain and circulated it through internet the same year.
In 2007, publisher of 'Junior Vikatan', a popular Tamil magazine in Tamil Nadu and renowned organic farmer Mr Nammalwar were sent legal notices by CENTEGRO for publication of an article about health damages caused by endosulfan.
The pesticide industry did not stop with activists and civil society groups. It also attacked scientists, including retired government scientists like Dr Aruna Dewan formerly with the National Institute of Occupational Health (NIOH). Her research and analysis confirmed the link between endosulfan and some of the health effects experienced in Kasaragod. While she was working in NIOH, the industry did not attack her personally, but as soon as she retired she was sent two legal notices. Similarly, Dr Padma Vankar of the Indian Institute of Technology-Kanpur faced the wrath of the industry in June 2008, when 'hired' protestors went in front of this premier institute with placards discrediting Dr Vankar's findings of high levels of pesticides in water samples, a study that she had done for CSE.
Conclusion
Endosulfan is a toxic, persistent, bioaccumulative organochlorine insecticide whose time has passed. So say 73 countries that have banned or are phasing it out. So say all but one of the members of the POPs Review Committee, and that one with a vested financial interest. Endosulfan will leave behind it a legacy of ill-heath, suffering, economic ruin for some, and environmental contamination for all. It is telling that the only way its manufacturers can defend it is by resorting to misinformation, abuse of those working in the interest of society and the environment, and attempts to undermine the integrity of two United Nations Conventions.
1The Stockholm Convention POPs Review Committee (POPRC) evaluates candidate substances for addition to the treaty.
2The language of the Endosulfan Risk Profile states, "…endosulfan…is likely, as a result of long range environmental transport, to lead to significant adverse human health and environmental effects, such that global action is warranted". UNEP-POPS-POPRC.5-10-Add.2.English.pdf
3Endosulfan: POPRC6 Recommendation. UNEP-POPS-POPRCC6FU-COMM-LE-ENDOSU-Recommend.En.pfd http://chm.pops.int/Convention/POPsReviewCommittee/POPRCMeetings/
POPRC6/POPRC6Followupcommunications/RecommendationofthePOPRConEndosulfan/
tabid/1085/language/en-GB/Default.aspx
4http://chm.pops.int/Convention/POPs%20Review%20Committee/Chemicals/
tabid/781/language/en-US/Default.aspx
5http://chm.pops.int/Convention/POPs%20Review%20Committee/Chemicals/
tabid/781/language/en-US/Default.aspx
6See for example http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/article1447725.ece.
7India is the world's largest organic cotton producer, contributing half of the world's organic cotton output. Organic cotton output increased 292% during 2007-08 to 73,702 tonnes compared with the previous year. This resulted in a global organic cotton increase by 152%, to 146,000 tonnes (Subramani MR. 2008. India tops in world organic cotton output. The Hindu Business Line. Nov 1. http://www.blonnet.com/2008/11/01/stories/2008110150302100.htm.)
8See for example http://www.deccanchronicle.com/business/eu-bid-ban-endosulfan-may-drive-food-prices-225
9Kumar TV, Raidu DV, Killi J, Pillai M, Shah P, Kalavadonda V, Lakhey S. 2009. Ecologically Sound, Economically Viable Community Managed Sustainable Agriculture in Andra Pradesh, India. The World Bank, Washington DC.
10See for example http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/article1447725.ece and http://www.business-standard.com/india/news/pesticide-makers-body-against-banendosulfan/425026/ .
11In The High Court Of Karnataka At Bangalore (Original Jurisdiction), Writ Petition No. /2011 (GM)
12Based on figures provided by the international Stewardship Council, the Indian Chemical Council and the Government of India. UNEP/POPS/POPRC.6/13/Add.1. http://chm.pops.int/Convention/POPs%20Review%20Committee/Chemicals/tabid/781/language/en-US/Default.aspx
13http://www.epa.gov/opp00001/pestsales/07pestsales/market_estimates06-07.pdf
14http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/opinion/columns/sharad-joshi/article1168315.ece?homepage=true
15http://www.business-standard.com/india/news/qa-pradip-dave-president-pmfai/425109
16Health Canada. 2009. Re-evaluation of Endosulfan Interim Mitigation Measures. Rev2009-03, April 15, 2009. http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/cps-spc/pest/part/consultations/_rev2009-03/endosulfan-eng.php.
17Washington State Department of Agriculture. 2009. Pollinator Protection Requirements for Section 18 Emergency Exemptions and Section 24(C) Special Local Need Registrations Washington State. June 17, 2009. http://www.agr.wa.gov/pestfert/Pesticides/docs/PollinatorSLNSect18.pdf.
18"Thionex 3EC Insecticide" specimen label. http://www.cdms.net/LDat/ld5Q1022.pdf; "Thionex 50W Insecticide" specimen label, http://www.cdms.net/LDat/ld5Q2002.pdf. Both viewed December 15, 2009.
19Case Study of Socio-economic Impact of Endosulfan Use on Bee Keeping and honey Collection. Thanal, 2011.
20(a) U.S. EPA. 2001. EFED Risk Assessment for the Reregistration Eligibility Decision on Endosulfan. Document ID No. EPA-HQ-OPP-2002-0262-0066, April 13, 2001. (b) UNEP/FAO. 2006. Endosulfan. Documentation received from the European Commission to support its notification of final regulatory action on endosulfan. United Nations Environment Programme and Food and Agriculture Organisation. UNEP/FAO/RC/CRC.3/10/Add.1.
21Decourtye A, Devillers J, Genecque E, Le Menach K, Budzinski H, Cluzeau S, Pham-Delegue MH. 2005. Comparative sublethal toxicity of nine pesticides on olfactory learning performances of the honeybee Apis mellifera. Arch Environ Contam Toxicol 48(2):242-50.
22The full title is the Rotterdam Convention on the Prior Informed Consent Procedure for Certain Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade.
23Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Chad, Gambia, Guinea Bissau, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and Senegal.
24The language of the Endosulfan Risk Profile states, "…endosulfan…is likely, as a result of long range environmental transport, to lead to significant adverse human health and environmental effects, such that global action is warranted"
25http://www.hil-india.com/
